The Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) is an international, interdisciplinary program that studies how institutions shape patterns of energy production and use, in turn affecting human welfare and environmental quality. Economic and political incentives and pre-existing legal frameworks and regulatory processes all play crucial roles in determining what technologies and policies are chosen to address current and future energy and environmental challenges. PESD research examines issues including: 1) effective policies for addressing climate change, 2) the role of national oil companies in the world oil market, 3) the emerging global coal market, 4) the world natural gas market with a focus on the impact of unconventional sources, 5) business models for carbon capture and storage, 6) adaptation of wholesale electricity markets to support a low-carbon future, 7) global power sector reform, and 8) how modern energy services can be supplied sustainably to the world's poorest regions.
Introduction
In 2009 the global coal market witnessed one of the most dramatic realignments it has ever seen -China, long a net exporter of coal, suddenly imported a record-smashing 126 Mt tons (see Figure 1) . 1 This inversion of China's role in global coal markets meant that Chinese imports accounted for nearly 15% of all globally traded coal, and China became the focal point of global demand as traditional import markets like Europe and Japan stagnated in the wake of the financial crisis. By the first quarter of 2010, even Colombia was defying established trade patterns by sending cargoes to China despite its massive geographic disadvantage to export coal into Asian markets. The middle kingdom's appetite for imported coal seems insatiable, and the "China Factor" appears to have ushered in a new paradigm for the global coal market.
But China doesn't "need" the coal. The world's largest coal producer cranked out 2. In this paper we outline a model that explains Chinese coal import patterns and that can allow the coal market to understand, and to some degree predict, China's coal import behavior. We argue that the unique structure of the Chinese coal market creates a series of key arbitrage relationships between Chinese domestic coal markets and international coal markets that determine Chinese import patterns. Based on this theory of China's import behavior, we construct an arbitragebased import model that explains the dramatic shift in Chinese net imports over the last several years.
The implications of this model are significant for the development of the global coal trade in the coming decade. First, we find that China's import behavior does not represent a "structural shift" in global markets. China, as a participant in the global coal market, is a cost-minimizer that will be both a buyer and seller in the global market as key price relationships fluctuate.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the arbitrage relationships that we describe directly link the domestic price of coal in China to the global price of coal. This linkage has significant implications for the use of coal and the cost of generating power globally in the coming decades.
Developments in China's domestic coal market will be a dominant factor determining global coal prices and trade flows (and by implication power prices in many regions). This makes understanding the domestic Chinese coal market, which operates according to a unique economic and political logic, crucial for any participant in the global markets. 
Geographic Fundamentals of the Chinese Coal Market
China's coal reserves and production are concentrated in the North and West of China. Three provinces in these regions -Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia -have 69% of the country's proven reserves and were home to half of national production in 2009. That same year Inner
Mongolia surpassed Shanxi to become the largest producer at 637 Mt; Shanxi produced 615 Mt, and Shaanxi produced 296 Mt. 4 70% of the production in these three provinces is exported outside of its home province to supply coal demand most heavily concentrated along the eastern and southern coasts. Figure 2 illustrates the basic geography of Chinese coal regions.
Northern coastal Chinese coal demand is served by a network of truck routes and railways that move coal east and south from western and northern production centers. But rail and truck capacity to supply coal to Southeast China is both insufficient and prohibitively expensive. Figure   4 shows the historical development of Russian, Indonesian, and Australian export coal prices from 2005.
8 FOB is a shipping term meaning "Free On Board", and in the coal market it indicates the price quoted for coal loaded on the vessel at the port of origin. 
Import Demand Centers
The port of Guangzhou in Guangdong province functions as the demand center of our arbitrage model. Guangdong is a heavily industrialized zone that has historically been the largest coal importing province. Coal imports by province for 2009 are shown in Table 2 
Freight Prices
The delivered cost of coal in Guangzhou (CIF) is calculated by adding freight costs between loading and discharge ports to the FOB coal cost. 15 Dry bulk freight rates from Indonesia, Russia, or Australia into China largely track international dry bulk freight markets which are volatile, internationally traded commodity markets (see historical freight rates in Figure 5 ).
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The model uses specific freight prices quoted from each FOB loading port and delivered into Guangzhou port provided by AXS Marine.
14 The basis difference between Guangzhou and other cities in Southeast China will be roughly the freight costs differential between those two locations. Thus while Guangzhou is the center of coal imports in China and is indicative of market conditions for imports in general, some minor basis differentials will exist for other locations. 15 There are a few other adjustments which we describe later. 16 The Baltic Dry Index, which is widely used to indicate the cost of chartering dry bulk freight vessels, 19 We assign port fees based on rates provided by AXS Marine.
Adjustments: Energy Content, Taxes, Exchange Rates, Transaction Costs
We make the following adjustments in order to more accurately reflect real market conditions:
First, coal buyers are buying energy. We therefore adjust all FOB prices to an energy equivalent USD/metric ton basis of 6,700 kcal/kg gross air dried (GAD).
20
The original energy content of FOB indices are shown in Figure 4 (above). Energy equivalent prices are shown in Figure 6 (below). 
Implications of Key ChinaCoalArb Assumptions
Several necessary assumptions in ChinaCoalArb may impact the performance of the model and should be noted when comparing model results to real market outcomes.
First, the model does not explicitly separate thermal from coking coal. 24 Though some coals can switch between these markets making the distinction blurry at times, buying behavior in these markets will differ under certain conditions. Most worth noting is that some demand for highquality material is likely less responsive to price movements than demand for thermal coal because high-quality coking coal supplies are much tighter in China and internationally. We suspect this accounts for a large share of Australian imports into China pre-2009 when CIF prices for most Australian coals compared to Qinhuangdao coals were significantly higher. Third, China announced that it would relax foreign exchange controls in June 2010, which has led to minor RMB appreciation. Possible RMB appreciation going forward could increase China's buying power for foreign coal and thus make imports more attractive.
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Fourth, while the indicative energy-equivalent coal ton that we have created reflects differences in energy content, the relationship of coal price to energy content may not always be linear (as we have already discussed). Thus lower CV coals that are priced at a deeper discount coals may present a greater arbitrage opportunity than our model indicates.
Fifth, while energy content is arguably the most significant variable impacting coal pricing, the model does not reflect several key variables that can also impact price. Ash, moisture, volatiles, sulfur, and other coal properties will also influence price. It is therefore important to note our energy-equivalent coal ton should be broadly indicative of buying behavior but cannot capture all variables that impact coal purchasing and pricing. 25 See NDRC: http://jgs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/t20100625_356688.htm 26 This is complicated because even coal buyers that can acquire coal at below-market, government-capped prices may still have to buy a fair amount of their supplies from the spot market. We estimate that 40-50% of coal supply for key SOEs is under term contract (and thus impacted by the recent cap) and the remainder is purchased on the spot market. 27 Albert Saputro and Adam Worthington of Macquarie Securities helpfully highlighted the importance of this issue to us, which they have analyzed in their own research.
Sixth, while we argue that Guangzhou is the best proxy to represent China's national import behavior, other importing locations will witness slightly different arbitrage relationships that might impact purchasing decisions. For instance, Shanghai is slightly farther from Indonesia and Australia than Guangzhou while slightly closer to Qinhuangdao and Russia. This will increase freight costs from the former two and favor coal shipped from the latter two.
Relevant External Factors Not Captured by ChinaCoalArb
Several macro-level factors that could impact coal imports should be noted.
First, there are technical limitations to imports that prevent a full switch to imports even if it was clearly the most profitable option. Power plant boilers are designed to burn specific specifications of coal, which is almost always domestic coal for energy security considerations.
However, power generators can blend imports and domestic coal supplies. For each boiler there will be a technical limitation on the amount of blending that can occur. 28 Other industrial applications, like cement or steel making, are likely also designed to burn domestic specifications of coal and may not be able to fully switch to imports.
Second, import port capacity is also a theoretical limit on possible Chinese coal imports (one that
has not yet been tested).
Model Results
Figure 7 28 From interviews with coal and power experts at Yudean Group in Guangdong. This is a complex engineering issue which we will not address in detail here as there are multiple variables that impact blending ratios at coal plants, though we do want to note that some blending limitations may exist.
national coal imports by month. Figure 8 displays the only arbitrage relationships in greater detail (weekly basis). This model therefore provides credible explanation of China's coal import behavior and explains
China's record imports in 2009. We conclude China's coal buying behavior follows the logic of a "cost minimizer" and China's coal imports will fluctuate according to the arbitrage differentials between domestic and international coal prices.
Drivers of Arbitrage Inversion in 2009
Analyzing causes of the dramatic inversion of the historical relationship between China's domestic coal market and the international coal market provides a more detailed understanding of the market conditions that caused this shift, and thus enables coal market observers to examine how likely these conditions are to carry forward. We argue that in the wake of the global Fourth, the relative strength of China's domestic coal prices was largely due to a series of regulatory events in key production regions that curtailed supply and supported prices.
Consistent with national coal mining policies, Shanxi province embarked on a major campaign of mine consolidation. The government began a program of closing small mines or consolidating them into larger mines and implementing more rigorous safety standards. The targets of that program are shown in Table 3 . The result was a shut-in of traditional supply that supported prices. There is evidence in summer 2010 that the program was not completely successful and that government officials may re-implement similar measures.
32 Table 3 -Mining consolidation targets in Shanxi.
Target 2009 Target 2010 Target
Mine number 2600 1053 1000
Average mine size 300,000 ton/yr 900,000 ton/yr 900,000 ton/yr Finally, temporary factors in China like weather interruptions of transport and weak hydro generation due to droughts contributed to higher domestic coal prices. 32 Research by Macquarie Securities in June 2010. 33 Two Markets, Two Resources is a Chinese term reflecting a strategy to encourage Chinese company and Chinese industry "Walking Out" of the country to explore both domestic markets and international markets.
There are a number of long term factors that will determine price relationship of Chinese coal to international coal. Several forthcoming studies from Stanford address a set of key issues and reforms that will impact China's domestic market such as the coal power conflict and resulting policy and market reforms, the possible vertical integration of China's coal and power industries, the consolidation of coal producing into larger mines, the adoption of more efficient power generation technologies, and the construction of major coal-power bases that will produce over 100 Mt/year each. Our findings indicate that China is a "cost minimizer" in the international market that will import heavily when the price is right -as it was in 2009 due to a confluence of circumstances we have described here -and largely rely on domestic coal when imports are unattractive.
The nature of Chinese demand for international coal is therefore fundamentally different from India, the other source of dramatic demand growth in international coal markets. India is structurally short coal because demand growth (mainly for power) has outstripped domestic coal supplies. China, on the other hand, is now the world's largest coal arbitrage trader. This means that the relationship between China's domestic coal price and the international coal price will be one of the key factors in determining global trade flows in the coming decade as China could just as easily buy 15-20% of internationally traded coal as it could buy very little.
China's role as world's largest coal arbitrageur has a hugely significant implication for the global coal market: it links the international price of coal to China's domestic price. China's buying and selling activity on the margins of its massive domestic coal market bring domestic and global prices closer to parity (though at present not to complete parity). In other words, what
